When distributing digital content over a broadcast channel it's often necessary to revoke users whose access privileges have expired, thus preventing them from recovering the content. This works well when users make a conscious decision to leave the system or have misbehaved, but numerous cases exist in which the revocation is in error and users are consequently left with the often onerous burden of getting reinstated. We introduce a gradual form of revocation that we call service degradation that enables the content distributor to provide "cues" to the user in the form of degraded system performance. The cues alert the user to their impending revocation and allow them to take the necessary action to remain in the system. Our protocols build on techniques for broadcast encryption and spam-fighting to provide the appropriate form of service for this previously ignored class of users.
INTRODUCTION
Traditional approaches to distributing content over a broadcast channel (see, for example, [13, 5, 27] ) allow for two types * A full version of this paper is available [3] . † Most of this research was conducted while this author was an intern at PARC. 1 We introduce protocols for the broadcast content distribution setting (e.g. pay-TV, online software) that provide appropriate service to all three types of users. Our enabling idea is to use broadcast techniques for revocation (e.g., [13, 22, 15] for the secure distribution of "hints" to what we term, variably hard functions (a generalization of the "moderately hard" functions of [1] and the "pricing functions" of [10] ). Hints allow the users to recover the session key from the variably hard function, and then the content, which is subsequently broadcast encrypted under this session key. The type of hint received determines the amount of work a user must do to recover the session key, and thus whether or not the user is provided with a cue. That is, a high-quality hint is given to the privileged users, a lesser quality hint is pro-vided to users who are near the end of their trial period or who are behind on their bills, and no hint is given to the revoked users (and so it is infeasible for revoked users to recover the content). We term our protocols degradation protocols to emphasize that they extend the notion of service revocation to service degradation.
Our protocols enable privacy-enhanced content access that integrates well with previously proposed approaches to secure digital content distribution. A traditional approach to content distribution is to require some form of user identification (e.g. log-in information) before releasing the content. This facilitates tracking of users and is potentially privacy-compromising. In our protocols, communication is effectively one-way: content is broadcast in encrypted form and so the distributor is unable to collect usage data. Further, our approach is a straightforward extension of existing methods for secure content distribution which may make adoption easier.
To summarize, we make the following contributions:
• A model of secure broadcast-channel services that allows for graceful service degradation based on the new notion of variably hard functions (Section 2) and a general technique for constructing secure degradation schemes (Section 3).
• A service degradation scheme specifically designed for broadcast-channel services that seek to enforce a trial period (e.g. online software). The protocol incurs constant communication overhead and constant user storage (Section 4.1).
• A service degradation scheme for any broadcast-channel service that employs a revocation scheme such as [22, 15] and incurs communication overhead and user storage costs that are on the same order as the underlying revocation scheme (Section 4.2).
Overview. This paper is organized as follows. We discuss related work in Section 1.1 and provide a model of service degradation and introduce our new tool, variably hard functions, in Section 2. In Section 3 we discuss the difference between degradation and revocation and provide a general technique for constructing degradation schemes. Section 4 contains our main constructions; in Section 4.1 we provide one specifically designed for trial period services and in Section 4.2 we provide a more general construction. In Section 5 we discuss simulation results and we conclude in Section 6.
Related Work
The study of secure content distribution over a broadcast channel is initiated in [13, 5] in which symmetric key cryptography is used to securely communicate information to dynamic sets of users. Since such protocols allow the content provider to prevent or revoke a user from accessing the content, they are often termed revocation protocols (a convention we follow here). Several extensions and improvements to [13, 5] have followed; we highlight a few that are particularly relevant to our work.
The idea of using secret sharing-based techniques (i.e. techniques similar to Shamir secret sharing [24] ) is refined in [19, 25, 21, 18] , in which protocols are provided that have the advantage of ensuring revoked users cannot recover the content through collusion. In Section 3 we show how the approach of [19] can be modified to yield degradation protocols.
A particular type of secret sharing-based protocol called a "subset-cover" protocol is introduced in [22] and refined in [15] . Subset-cover protocols are tree-based and provide desirable communication overhead, and storage costs; in particular, O(r) communication overhead (where r is the number of revoked users) and user storage that is polylog in the total number of users. Such protocols can form the basis for the degradation protocol we introduce in Section 4.2.
A key component of all of our protocols is what we term variably hard functions. Such functions are a generalization of the "pricing functions" introduced in [10] and "moderately hard" functions in [1] . In [10] pricing functions enable email senders to provide easy-to-check proofs of computational effort, thus providing evidence that the email is not spam. The functions in [1] provide easily checked proofs of memory accesses rather than computational effort, as the authors argue memory access speeds are less likely to vary across machines than computational power. Other functions that enable such proofs of work are discussed in [16] . All these works are motivated by scenarios such as bulk mail (or spam) in which there is no need to enforce different work levels on different users, hence they don't consider the notion of graceful service degradation that is our focus. Informally speaking, our variably hard functions yield easily checked proofs that a certain, variable, number of operations have been executed, where an operation could be closely aligned with a computation, a memory-access, or some other process. The number of executed operations varies according to what the user knows about the function, and this is what allows our protocols to enforce fine-grained service degradation.
Finally, we note that degradation is related to the notion of differentiated services for the Internet (see, for example, [11] ) in that both techniques are intended to increase overall customer satisfaction by enabling a vendor (of content or Internet service, respectively) to recognize more categories of users. However our setting is fundamentally different in that we enforce service degradation on users based on their account status while differentiated service protocols allow users to choose their level of service according to the user's budget constraints and/or resource needs.
MODEL AND TOOLS
The familiar setting for broadcast-channel services (see, for example [13] ) includes a center C that distributes content to a set, N , of users. In each of a sequence of sessions, encrypted data is broadcast. Each broadcast includes a header Head, consisting of an encrypted session key, SK, and the content encrypted under this session key. C can encrypt the content in such a way that a subset P ⊆ N of "privileged" users can decrypt the content, while the the users in the set R = N \ P , are not able to recover the content and are thus termed "revoked". The revoked users are those who have not paid for the content. The sets N , P, R can change over time. Schemes for distributing broadcast-channel services to the dynamically changing sets, N , P and R are often called revocation schemes.
We consider an extension of this setting that we term broadcast-channel services with degradation, or simply, a degradation scheme, in which the set of users N is partitioned into three subsets N = P ∪ R ∪ D. The sets P and R have the same roles as before, while the new set D denotes the users who experience degraded service in terms of the ease with which they recover the content from the broadcast and hence we term these users "degraded". A user in D can decrypt SK and the content, but doing so requires additional "work" (much more than for a user in P ). The amount of work can be varied as C desires and may be measured computationally [16] , by memory accesses [9] or by any other operation that is deemed to not advantage any particular user. We enforce this work requirement by the use of a "hard function", F (·), (defined precisely in Section 2.1) whose value on input v determines session key, SK. Informally speaking, computing F (v) requires a "hint"; the amount of hint that is available is inversely correlated with the amount of work that's expended when generating F (v). In particular, users in R are unable to recover a hint from the header, and so it is infeasible for such users to recover SK, while users in D recover partial hints from the header and thus are able to recover SK with some work, and users in P recover a "complete" hint (i.e. v) and thus reconstruct SK efficiently. Indeed, we require that a degradation scheme be able to vary the amount of work a user in D must perform according the the class the user is in, where the class indicates how severely the user is to be degraded. The class of a user may be a function of when the user last paid for the content. We induce an ordering on the classes such that users in P are thus in the "highest" class, whereas users in R are in the "lowest" class. the following definition makes this precise. Before defining a degradation scheme we introduce some terminology and notation. Let κ be the security parameter (the width of the keys). We say η : R → [0, 1] is a negligible function if for any c ∈ R, there exists κc ∈ R, such that η(κ) < 1/κ c for all κ ≥ κc. We use x ∈r S to indicate that the element x is chosen uniformly at random from the set S.
Lastly, we often make use of a symmetric encryption scheme E k (·), that is assumed to be "perfect" in the sense that, without knowing the key k, it is infeasible to decrypt a ciphertext, E k (M ), or deduce any information on the key k. In Section 4.2, given a set S ⊆ N we use the notation, E S (M ) to denote the use of a revocation scheme (e.g. [22, 15] ) to encrypt a message, M so that users in S are each able to recover M and users who are not in S are unable to, even when colluding. E S (M ) might actually consist of a set of ciphertexts generated with a symmetric encryption scheme under various keys (e.g. 
Variably Hard Functions
In this section we formally define the functions that our degradation schemes rely upon. The following definition is more general, and somewhat more formal, than the notions of "pricing" functions in [10, 9] and "moderately hard" functions in [1] . We use a variably hard function F , and a corresponding test function g, in the following way in degradation schemes. F and g are made public. The center, C, generates a random value v∈r{0, 1} k and encrypts some content with the key derived from F (v). Further, the center wants to allow a user u ∈ D to decrypt the content, but only after u performs O(2 ) operations. For this purpose, the center gives g(v) and some Y ( ) ∈ Hints(v) to u. Thus, assuming a perfect encryption scheme, to decrypt the content, u needs to compute F (v); and doing so requires u to perform at least Ω(2 c ) operations (as guaranteed by the definition). Intuitively, the hardness of F relies on the hardness of recovering v from g(v) and Y ( ) . That is, the one-wayness of g(·), even given Y , is necessary.
Note that a user can compute F (v) given g (v) and Y ( ) with at most O(2 · poly(κ)) operations, where poly(κ) is a polynomial in κ. One way to accomplish this is by enumerating all elements y ∈ Y ( ) and testing whether g(y) = g(v); once A finds such y, F (y) is easily computed and F (y) = F (v). Since |Y ( ) | = 2 , this process incurs O(2 · poly(κ)) operations. In the rest of the paper, we will usually drop the poly(κ) factor since the exponential is much more important. Note that saying that the user can compute F (v) with O(2 ) effort is not in conflict with the second condition of the Definition 3 even when c = 1: the two O(·) notations denoting the operational effort hide different constants. 
A Variably Hard Function Construction
The following construction uses a modification of the memorybound functions used for fighting spam in [9] to construct a variably hard function for which the "hardness" is measured in terms of memory accesses.
We first recall the memory-bound function construction in [9] , and then describe how we modify the function to construct a variably hard function. The input to the memorybound function is a tuple, r, containing the message of the email, the receiver, and the date. The output of the function is a value z for which the procedure Test(r, z) described below succeeds. Test(r, z) employs four hash functions,
H0(·), H1(·), H3(·), H4(·)
, and a fixed table T . It is parameterized by positive integers t and , where determines the "hardness" of the function. The definition of Test(r, z) follows:
) Succeed if, after the loop above, the last bits of H3(A) are all zero.
Fail otherwise. In [9] , the authors prove that in order to compute this function, one needs Ω(2 t) memory accesses to T (for certain specified assumptions on the parameters and the platform).
The above memory-bound function must be modified in order to yield a variably hard function because it is in fact a one-to-many relation since there might be several values z for which Test(r, z) succeeds. This is not an issue for 4 There is a technicality relating to the hints Y ( ) : it can take roughly 2 bits to describe Y ( ) . This is infeasible since it would imply 2 communication and a similar effort on center's part. To resolve this technicality, we restrict the set Hints(v) to sets Y ( ) that have a short description. In particular, for the purpose of this paper, it is sufficient to consider only the sets Y ( ) , where a set Y ( ) is the set of solutions y ∈ {0, 1} κ to the equation
. In this case we can describe Y ( ) with only O(κ 2 ) bits.
spam-fighting, however this is at odds with our goal of ensuring each user generates the same value (which is, or can be used to generate, the session key). In addition, to allow for many classes of degraded users we need to be able to parameterize the number of operations required of a user to recover this common value. To achieve these properties we define the function U (r, z), r ∈ {0, 1} κ , z ∈ {0, 1} κ , as follows:
In the terminology of the function U , note that the original function of [9] requires finding a z * for which the last digits of U (r, z * ) are zero; z * is then the output of the function from [9] . We don't make this requirement but rather simply generate H3(At) as the output.
To make this into a variably hard function, we define the test function as
is a hash function with codomain {0, 1}
κ (modelled as a random oracle), and we let F (·) be the identity function
κ . To see that F (·), with the test function g(·), is a variably hard function note first that g(·) and F (·) are efficiently computable. Furthermore, since
Given a hint Y ( ) ∈ Hints(v), finding such z * ∈ Y ( ) takes, in expectation, Ω(2 t) memory accesses by the same argument as that involved in the proof of Theorem 1 of [9] .
Lastly, we mention that we need the same assumptions on the architecture and parameters |A|, t, h as in Theorem 1 of [9] , as well as the additional assumption that the codomain of U (·) is {0, 1} 2κ (2 has no particular importance and can be replaced by other constant bigger than 1). Thus, there is a negligible probability of the existence of two different
, and thus each user will arrive at the same output that in turn can be used to generate the same session key, SK.
For another example of a variably hard function (based on computational effort), see [3] .
DEGRADATION VS. REVOCATION
In this section we discuss the difference between degradation and revocation and provide an illustrative construction. Since degradation is a generalization of revocation, any degradation scheme yields a revocation scheme. Conversely, a revocation scheme that is capable of revoking sufficiently many users, coupled with a hard function, can be used to accomplish degradation. This is done by repeatedly invoking the revocation scheme to target users in the various degradation classes. For example, in the case of a single degradation class, let v = (v1, . . . , vκ) be such that the session key is (or, is derived from) F (v), for some variably hard function, F (·). The revocation scheme can first be used to generate an encrypted broadcast from which the users in P can recover v1, . . . , v for some < κ, and then the revocation scheme can be used again to generate an encrypted broadcast from which the users in P ∪D can recover v +1 , . . . , vκ. The "check" value g(v) can be broadcast unencrypted. After these three broadcasts, users in P have the value v (the "complete" hint) and thus can easily recover the session key. Users in D have a partial hint (indeed, an -dimensional subspace that contains v) and can recover the session key in O(2 ) operations (for example, by repeatedly guessing the v and testing each guess against g(v)). Finally, it is infeasible for users in R to recover the session key because doing so requires guessing a bit string of length κ. This technique can be extended to more than three classes while incurring a number of broadcasts that is proportional to the number of classes. We call this technique for using a revocation scheme to degrade users repeated revocation.
Because repeated revocation requires a revocation scheme capable of revoking |D| + |R| users (rather than just |R|) it may be less efficient. That is, given the constraints of the particular application, it may be desirable to construct a degradation scheme directly rather than via a revocation scheme. In this section, we demonstrate one such construction inspired by the revocation protocol of [19] .
Before describing our construction we give a brief overview of the structure of our degradation protocols (presented in this section and section 4). Recall that we have L+2 classes, C0, . . . CL+1, with the convention that users from the class Ci are "degraded more" than the users from the class Ci−1. The union of C1, . . . CL is the set of all degraded users, D. To each class Ci, we assign a hardness parameter, ei. For users in class Ci, it will take roughly 2 e i operations to compute F (v) for some input, v. For i = 2, . . . , L, the fact that ei−1 ≤ ei ensures that users in Ci have no better service than users in Ci−1.
Finally, we make use of a variably hard function, F , in the following basic way. Consider some value v ∈ {0, 1} κ and its associated set of partial hints, Hints(v). We ensure that each user in Ci is able to recover an ei-dimensional space, Construction. For simplicity of exposition we assume a single degradation class (L = 1), that is, all the users in D experience the same impaired level of service. Our construction is similar to the construction in [19] but differs in the definition of the session key and the Encrypt(·) algorithm. In the following, let 0 < p < 1 be a constant chosen by the center, C, and let t, γ be positive integers such that (t + 1)γ = κ.
1. Params outputs m keys, k1, . . . , km ∈ {0, 1} κ , a randomly generated polynomial f (x) = atx t + . . . + a0 ∈ F2γ [x], and C partitions the keys into r sets, S1, . . . , Sr, where for i = 1, . . . , r, Si = {ki,1, . . . , ki,s} ⊆ {k1, . . . , km}, for some integer, s > 0. 2. For every u ∈ N , KeyGen allocates to u a randomly chosen key from each of S1, . . . , Sr. Thus, a user u stores r keys in total. 3. Encrypt outputs the pairs,
is a test function for some variably hard function F (·) (Definition 3), and the set T is chosen from {k1, . . . , km} as follows: for i = 1, . . . , m, ki ∈ T with probability α where,
• α = 0 if there exists u ∈ R such that u received ki from KeyGen, • α = p if for every u ∈ R, u did not receive ki from KeyGen but there exists a user u ∈ D who received ki from KeyGen, • Otherwise, α = 1.
To intuitively see that this construction is a degradation protocol note that a user in P is more likely to have a key, k ∈ T than a user in D. Further, a user in R has none of the keys in T and hence, a user in D is more likely to have a key, k ∈ T than a user in R. The size of the subsets of {(b k , f(b k ))|k ∈ T } that are recovered by users during the invocation of KeyRecovery are consequently expected to be of decreasing size for users in P , D and R respectively. These subsets are essentially hints for v = (at|| . . . ||a0), and hence privileged users have more substantial hints than degraded users, who in turn have more substantial hints than revoked users. We provide an example lemma showing how the parameters can be chosen to achieve different operation costs for the three types of users. Due to space constraints the proof of this lemma is deferred to [3] . 
A user in R has no keys in T and so it is infeasible for such a user to recover SK.
In addition, to achieve these properties with a repeated revocation protocol using underlying revocation scheme [19] , one incurs a comparable user storage costs but a factor of
A significant difference between this example construction and the repeated revocation approach is that this example provides no collusion resistance against degraded users (although, as in repeated revocation, revoked users gain nothing by colluding). It is certainly possible to vary the parameters to gain some collusion resistance against degraded users, however we point out that the purpose of the degradation scheme is to alert or warn degraded users that they may be revoked soon without action on their part, and not to prevent them from accessing the content. Hence, collusion resistance seems less important in their case.
This construction shows that it is possible to design degradation protocols that are better than what an obvious use of revocation, that is the repeated revocation protocol, provides. In the following section we explore this further and provide two degradation protocols tailored to specific online service settings.
USAGE-TAILORED DEGRADATION
In this section, we present two different degradation schemes, each tailored to a different usage scenario. The schemes are designed to meet the constraints of each usage setting, often leveraging the specific attributes of the usage scenario to do so. For example, in the first construction we assume the degradation schedule is known in advance, as is the case with online services that offer a trial period to new users. Online training (see for example, [26, 7] ), online consumer applications (see, for example, [17] ) and pay TV are three markets in which trial periods are often given. In such a setting, users have access to the online service for a trial period (e.g., of 30 days); after the trial period ends, users are still able to use the service, but with degraded quality. The level of degradation depends on the time elapsed since the end of the trial period and takes the form of a delay in the user's ability to access the service, not in the quality of the service once it is received. In other words, a trial period is followed by a degradation period that gently reminds users that the trial period has ended. Because the degradation schedule is known in advance we are able to meet it with constant communication overhead and user storage.
In the second construction, we allow for an unpredictable degradation schedule, as is most likely in the subscription mode of an online service. Users subscribe to the service and payments are due at regular intervals (e.g., monthly). With a degradation scheme for subscriptions, when a user is late on the payments (an event that is unpredictable by the service provider), the user experiences a delay in accessing the service, with the exact amount of delay depending on the overdue period. In this way, the user is reminded to pay the overdue bill. Because this setting is similar to the conventional revocation setting in that the class of a user can change in an unpredictable manner, we are able to leverage existing revocation techniques to achieve our degradation goals with communication overhead and user storage that are on the same order as what is incurred by the revocation techniques.
Finally, we note that both of our constructions achieve collusion resistance that is stronger than what is required by Definition 2. In particular, not only are users in R unable to access the service content through collusion, but users in D are unable to reduce the total amount of work needed to retrieve the content through collusion. Although we don't view this as a crucial property of a degradation scheme (since the sole purpose of the work enforced on users in D is to provide a warning that they may soon be revoked) it is desirable as it makes the hierarchy robust.
Known degradation schedule
The following is a precise description of the service schedule for a user who is granted access to some online service for a trial period of T days. Recall that we view the service as being made available in a sequence of sessions. Assuming a user signs up for the service on day t, the user is allowed to decrypt broadcast sessions with essentially no operational cost 5 on days t, t+1, t+2, . . . , t+T −1 (i.e. during this time the user is in set P ). On day t + T , the user needs 2 e 1 time to decrypt a session (i.e. the user is transferred to class C1); in general, for i = 1 . . . L, on day t + T − 1 + i, the user is in class Ci and needs 2 e i operations to decrypt a session. On day t + T + L, the user is in set R, that is the user cannot decrypt any session at all.
To implement this policy we define the following scheme in which the initialization algorithm, Params(1 κ ), establishes:
• A variably hard function F (·) with a corresponding test function g(·);
• A one-way permutation W : {0, 1} κ → {0, 1} κ , such that any algorithm running in O(2 ζκ ) inverts W with probability O(2 −ζκ ), for some constant ζ ≤ 1;
• δi = ei − ei−1 (with the convention that e0 = 0 and eL+1 = κ); • Sets {Kt}t and {At}t such that Kt = W (Kt+1) and At = W (At+1), t ≥ 1; these are formed by randomly choosing values Kt+α, At+α, where α is a big integer (e.g., representing several years), and computing respectively Kt, At. 6 The key distribution, KeyGen, works as follows. If a user u began a trial period on day t, they get Kt+T −1 and At+T −1. This allows the user u to decrypt the content without additional work in sessions on days {t, . . . , t+T −1}, and decrypt as the expense of additional work on days {t + T, . . . , t + T + L − 1}.
On any given day there are several sessions (the number of the sessions is a function of how many times we want to impose the work overhead to the degraded users). The broadcast made at the beginning of a session is composed of the header, Head, that contains the encrypted session key, SK. The content is then broadcast encrypted under the session key, SK.
The header encrypting the session key has the structure outlined in Figure 4 .1.
The decryption algorithm works as follows. Suppose the user subscribes on day t0. On day t, t < t0 + T (within the trial period), the user can simply compute Kt = W t 0 +T −t−1 (Kt 0 +T −1), and decrypt EK t (SK). When t0 + T ≤ t < t0 + T + L, the user is in class Ci = Ct−t 0 −T +1 because the user knows only the first κ − ei bits of v, which are y 
Security Proof
Next we prove that the construction above indeed satisfies the properties of a degradation scheme according to Definition 2. Note that the first correctness property is trivially satisfied as discussed above.
Since revoked users know none of the κ bits of v, the scheme is collusion resistant. Also, note that the scheme is resistant to collusion by degraded users (as discussed in the introduction to Section 4) because of the manner in which Kt and At are distributed: for any set S of users, the user who subscribed most recently is able to compute all the information known by everybody in S. Thus, in a coalition of users, the user in the best class does not learn anything new and cannot raise their class.
Next, we prove second and third correctness properties are satisfied with UTi = 2 e i and LTi = 2 ce i , where c is the constant from the Definition 3 of the hard functions. 
. , A1}. Since E(·)
is a perfect encryption, the user needs to recover either Kt or F (v), and decrypt the corresponding part of the header,
κ → {0, 1} δ i in the random oracle model. 
where nsns is the maximum number of sessions per day). All other information can be computed from the above information.
During A's execution, A can generate several calls to the oracles G δ j . Again, we say a call to oracle G δ j is successful if it is made with input M f,s ⊕ A f −j+1 for some valid f, j, s. For technical reasons, we are interested in the case when all M f,s ⊕ A f −j+1 are different, which happens with
. This probability expression comes from the following two arguments. 1) For all valid f and j, A f −j+1 are different with probability at least 1− 7 Since W is a one-way permutation, W x−y is also a one way permutation against time 2 ζκ . In particular, this means that the output of W x−y is equal to the input with probability at most O(2 −ζκ ).
Let 1 − ∆ be the probability that all M f,s ⊕ A f −j+1 differ one from another; from the argument above, ∆ ≤
. Let λ be the probability of generating a successful call during A's execution, given that all M f,s ⊕A f −j+1 differ.
Suppose A makes a successful call given that all M f,s ⊕ A f −j+1 differ. At the moment of the successful call, from the point of view of A, all
−ζκ , since, otherwise, we could invert W as follows. Consider IW , inverter for W : simulate A on input At−i and random values for the rest of the inputs; A makes some calls to the oracles; choose at random one of the calls to the oracles; guess values f, s; xor the input to the oracle with M f,s to obtain A f −j+1 ; finally, compute
Since W chooses at random among at most τ oracle calls made by A, and among L, nsns values for f and respectively s, IW is successful with probability at least λ nsnsLτ . However any inverter has success probability of at most 2 −ζκ , implying that
Suppose A does not make a successful call, given that all M f,s ⊕A f −j+1 differ (which happens with probability 1−λ). In this case, all of A's input except At−i is distributed uniformly random from A's point of view. Furthermore, since A makes τ = O(2 ce i ) operational effort, by a simulation argument as above, A can compute F (v) with probability no better than stated in the definition of the hard function, i.e., at most O(2 −ce i ). Concluding, we have that
We can choose κ such that cei < ζκ/2, yielding 2
L, the number of degradation levels, and nsns, the number of session per day, are constants. Thus, we have that
Unknown degradation schedule
We now consider the more general online service setting in which the degradation scheme is unknown. That is, the center does not know when or if a user will be degraded or revoked, or when or if the user will be reinstated as a privileged user.
As an example of this setting consider a user who subscribes to an online service that bills the user periodically. If a bill payment is overdue, the service for that user is gradually degraded until either the user pays the bill and their service is subsequently reinstated (i.e. they rejoin class P ), or the user does not pay the bill and their service contin- ues to be degraded until the user is revoked and the service becomes unavailable to the user. To model degradation in this subscription setting we again consider time as divided into sessions. In each session C may broadcast what we call a P refix. A P refix enacts a change in hierarchy (i.e. a change in one or more of P, D or R). Regardless of whether or not a P refix is sent, C always sends a header, Head, at the beginning of each session (and immediately after any P refix). The purpose of the header is the same as before, namely, to establish a new session key, SK, in such a way that each user must do the operational work to recover the session key that's specified by their class. The service content is then broadcast encrypted under the session key SK. The contents of P refix and Head are made precise later in this section.
Because in this setting the degradation schedule is unpredictable, any degradation scheme needs the ability to degrade (or revoke) an arbitrary set of users. To accomplish this we leverage an efficient revocation scheme and the ideas from Section 4.1. A description of the scheme follows.
The initialization algorithm, Params(1 κ ), establishes: • A hard function F (·), and a corresponding test function g(·); • A one-way permutation W : {0, 1} κ → {0, 1} κ , such that any algorithm with time at most 2 ζκ inverts W (·) with probability less than 2 −ζκ ; • δi = ei − ei−1 (assuming e0 = 0 and eL+1 = κ); • A revocation scheme S, such that, for any set S ⊂ N and message m, S can produce E S (m) that can only be decrypted by users in S (see Section 2) . S could be the SD [22] or LSD [15] revocation schemes, or, if maintaining current user state isn't a problem, then the stateful scheme in the Appendix of [3] can be used. Let K S u represent the private information allocated to user u by the scheme S (note that K S u can be a simple key or a set of keys as in [22, 15, 6] , and the revocation scheme construction that we provide in the Appendix of [3] ).
• The sequence {At}t, t ≥ 1, such that At = W (At+1); this series can be set-up by choosing a random value At+α, where α is a big integer (as mentioned in the first construction, it is easy to reduce α to L); The key distribution, KeyGen, works as follows. When user u subscribes in session t, u obtains K S u as specified by S, as well as the current values of KP , KR, At−1. With these keys, u can decrypt the content in session t with a constant number of operations (i.e. without any degradation "penalty").
The header generation algorithm, Encrypt, can generate several possible header structures; the choice of the particular structure depends on whether or not the user hierarchy changes. For ease of exposition, we first consider the header when the hierarchy does not change (Figure 4 .2). The header structure is very similar to that of Section 4.1.
To ensure the properties of a degradation scheme over all sessions, we preserve the following properties for current t, K, KR, and term them the invariant, I: 8 • Each privileged user u ∈ P knows the current KP , KR, as well as At−1;
At−i, the current KR, but not the current KP ; • Any revoked user u ∈ R does not know neither current KR nor the current KP ; • No user knows At for the current value of t.
For a header, Head
unknown , the decryption algorithm, KeyRecovery, works as follows. A privileged user u ∈ P can simply decrypt SK using keys KR and KP . A degraded user u ∈ Ci decrypts g(v), computes the hint y
, and finally F (v) to decrypt SK. A revoked user will be unable to decrypt the header at all.
The harder case is when the user hierarchy changes. To describe this case, we specify first the allowed hierarchy transitions (i.e., the allowed changes in users hierarchy). To model our scenario of service subscription, we need the following hierarchy transitions: Degrade: a set S of users from the privileged set P move to the set D of degraded users. Specifically, these users leave the class P of privileged set and join C1, the levelone degradation class. The center will employ this transition when the users in S are late on payments, and the center wants to initiate gradual degradation of the service for the users in S. Lower: further degradation of users in D, that is the class C1 becomes C2, the class C2 becomes C3, and so forth. In particular, the users from the class CL become revoked, i.e, they leave the class D of degraded users and join the class R of revoked users. The center employs this transition periodically to continue the gradual degradation of service for users from D.
Transition Center action
Prefix structure Revoke: a set S from P ∪ D is revoked. Specifically, each user u ∈ S leaves its class and joins the class R of revoked users. The center employs this transition when it detects misbehavior by the users in S (e.g. piracy). Raise: a set S of users is raised from a lower level to the class P of privileged users. The center will raise the level of users S when these users pay overdue bills and thus do not need to be degraded (or revoked) anymore.
Each transition is enforced by a broadcast of a corresponding header prefix P refix, which is followed by the header Head unknown defined in Figure 4 .2. 9 Figure 4 .3 presents the prefix structures for each of the four transitions, as well as the resulting modifications to the hierarchies and state.
For each type of hierarchy transition, the table shows the actions of the center. The center performs these actions before it broadcasts the corresponding prefix. Each of the prefixes serve to update the set of keys each user knows in order to preserve the invariant I. Note that, in fact, we can prepend several prefixes to the header Head unknown . Given the invariant I, the security discussion is very similar to the one given in Section 4.1.1 since the structure of the header Head unknown is largely the same with Head known from the Section 4.1.1 (except that Head unknown is encrypted with the key KR). The correctness of the invariant I itself is easily verified -because all the class transitions rely on the encryption in the underlying revocation scheme S.
In addition, collusion-resistance for the revoked users follows from the invariant and the fact that Head unknown is encrypted with the key KR.
SIMULATION
In this section we present two simulations to demonstrate how our schemes can be used in practice. Our timings are based on the experiments of [9] .
In the first simulation, we use a specific schedule for the degradation of users. In particular, we choose specific values for the degradation parameters (L and {ei}i) in the scheme 9 Although it is not necessary to encrypt all five terms of the bracketed expression in the figure under KR, since doing so doesn't increase the cost of the scheme significantly we choose to encrypt them all the simplify the proof and exposition.
of Section 4.2 that achieve graceful service degradation. In the second simulation, we analyze the broadcast communication overhead of our schemes in a representative instantiation of the Section 4.2 degradation scheme.
Degradation schedule. Recall that the degradation scheme of Section 4.2 can be naturally applied to broadcast-channel subscription services such as pay-TV. For our simulation we assume all users have their bill due on the same day and it is a 30 day bill cycle. In each of the first 7 days users who have not paid that cycle's bill are degraded. A user who does not pay their bill during any of those 7 days is revoked on the 8th day. For simplicity of exposition, we assume any user either pays on the first day or does not pay on days 1 through 7, and hence is revoked. We further assume that all the users who are revoked during one pay cycle pay their bill in between day 8 of that bill cycle and day 1 of the next, and thus are reinstated at the beginning of the next 30-day billing cycle.
The users are equipped with a settop box that decrypts the content and computes the variably hard function. The considered settop is a GCT-AllWell STB3036N (specific details can be found in [9] ).
For a variably hard function we choose a memory-bound function, and, specifically, the MBound function described in [9] (adapted as described in section 2.1.1).
As discussed earlier, "degraded service" takes the form of a delay in a user's ability to access the content (decrypt a session). That is, before each session, a degraded user has to expend operations, thus consuming time, computing the hard function and decrypting the header. A session corresponds to a show (e.g., a TV show) and is approximated to be one hour long. Some sample delays are shown in the Table 1. Table 1 also shows the values of ei that are necessary to achieve the stated delays. The exact times needed to compute the hard function are estimated using the experimental results of [9] . Specifically, [9] claims that with a value of ei = 15, the settop needs roughly 42 seconds to compute the function MBound on an input. Broadcast overhead. Next, we analyze the overhead in broadcast communication due to the additional headers that are needed by our degradation scheme.
We consider the same scenario as in the simulation above. Additionally, we assume that there are n = 10 8 subscribers. In any billing cycle, there are d = 1% · n = 10 6 subscribers that are late with their payment and these subscribers are degraded as a group in each billing cycle; eventually, all these users pay their bills and are reinstated, although for the simulation we assume they aren't reinstated until the next billing cycle.
Finally, we use LSD [15] as our revocation scheme S from 4.2. With the security parameter being κ = 128, in LSD scheme, a broadcast E S (m) takes at most 4κ · |m| · |S| = 512 · |m| · |S| bits [15] .
We compile the broadcast overheads in Table 2 , and sort them by different sources of communication overhead; we also specify how frequently each overhead is incurred. We did not consider the effect of revoking the pirates due to lack of space and because it is not the focus of our paper. Note the prefixes can be broadcast during the night or other non-rush time.
Source
Frequency Total #bits/unit of time Head · 2d = 785Mb/day 
CONCLUSION AND OPEN PROBLEMS
To the best of our knowledge our work is the first to provide a warning mechanism that is bound to content retrieval and as in any new area such there is room for improvement. For example, we believe it is possible to extend an arbitrary hard function for use in a degradation scheme (as we demonstrated for the particular hard function of [9] ) but a proof of this would be useful.
Additionally, future work might include a better parametrization of operational effort imposed on degraded users. At the moment, the difference in effort among degraded classes is exponential: a user in class Ci has to do an amount of work that is a factor of 2 δ i larger than users in class Ci−1. Even if all δi = 1, the work increases exponentially as the degraded classes become worse. To achieve a more controlled difference, we might, for example, consider using two (or more) variably hard functions in parallel such that a class Ci has to do work proportional to, say, 2 e i + 2 e i .
